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The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e)
Robert A. Downing* and Richard L. Miller, Jr.**
I. Introduction
Rule 2(e) 1 of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rules of Practice
is one of the primary means by which the SEC exercises control over accountants
and other professionals who practice before the Commission.' Recent 2(e)
proceedings against accountants demonstrate that the SEC has converted the
rule from one designed to serve the limited salutary purpose of exercising dis-
ciplinary authority over the incompetent, unethical or dishonest accounting
practitioner to a rule which has effectively been utilized to pervasively regulate
accounting firms and the profession as a whole?
This expansion of the regulatory process has come without the benefit or in-
ducement of any recent legislative enactment mandating such an approach and
has brought into question not only the means by which the Commission has
implemented Rule 2(e) but the fundamental issue of the existence and scope of
the Commission's statutory authority to undertake any disciplinary action against
accountants and other professionals practicing before it. This article will analyze
these and other significant issues raised by the Commission's recent 2 (e) proceed-
ings.
Partner, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois.
** Associate, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois.
1 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1978).
2 See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970).
The Commission's arsenal of enforcement tools includes the explicit authority to seek
injunctive relief against securities laws violations (Securities Act § 20 and Exchange Act § 21),
(discussed at text accompanying notes 32-35 infra); and the foremost enforcement power to
refer evidence of securities laws violations to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution
(Securities Act § 20(b) and Exchange Act § 21(e)). See Matthews, Criminal Prosecutions
Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC
Criminal Cases, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1971); Morrison, SEC Criminal References, 11
REv. SEC. REG. 991 (1978). See also United States v. Fields, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) U 96,074 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,552 (2d
Cir. 1978).
3 For an excellent discussion regarding the usage of 2(e) proceedings against accountants
see Bialkin, Sanctions Against Accountants, 8 Rav. SEC. REG. 823 (1975), and as a means to
discipline attorneys, Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice Before
the SEC: Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice,
25 MERCER L. REV. 637 (1974). For a critical view of Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
2(e) proceedings see Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the
SEC, 24 EMORY L. J. 747, 762 (1975); Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibili-
ties to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31, 62-65 (1975). For a statement of the Commission's
view of 2(e) proceedings see Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Accountants:
Philosophy, Objectives and Approach, 28 VAND. L. REV. 19 (1975); Garrett, New Directions
in Professional Responsibility, 29 Bus. LAW. 7 (1974); Gonson, Disciplinary Proceedings and
Other Remedies Available to the SEC, 30 Bus. LAW. 191 (1975); Sommer, Accountants: A
Flexible Standard, I LITIGATION 35 (1975); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under
the Federal Securities Laws--Some Observations, 68 Nw.U. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1973); Sonde,
Professional Responsibility--A New Religion, or the Old Gospel?, 24 EMoRY L. J. 827, 836
(1975). For an accountant's perspective of Rule 2(e) see L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING
AND PRACTICE, 18-31 (1972); Jaenicke, The Effect of Litigation on Independent Auditors,
COMMISSION ON AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITIES, RESEARCH STUDY No. 1, 46-53 (AICPA, 1977).
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II. The Commission's Authority
Rule 2 (e) (1) provides that the Commission may deny, temporarily or per-
manently, the "privilege" of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any
person who is found by the Commission, after notice and hearing:
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others;
(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in un-
ethical or improper professional conduct; [or]
(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the viola-
ation of any provision of the federal securities laws, or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder.
4
Practice is defined, under Rule 2 (g), to include not only transacting business with
the Commission but also preparing any statement, opinion or other paper, by an
accountant, which is included within any document filed with the Commission.'
As it was originally instituted, Rule 2, effective September 13, 1935, dealt
exclusively with attorneys and agents who appeared before the Commission in a
"representative capacity."6 As initially framed, the rule established an SEC
Bar with special admission procedures and did not purport to reach accountants
or other experts who prepared documents or rendered opinions in conjunction
with SEC filings.
In March 1938, the Commission issued its decision in Joseph M. Van
Dorm7 wherein it held that it possessed the power to regulate and disbar an ac-
countant as a practicing agent even though the conduct giving rise to the pro-
ceeding did not involve representation in a Commission proceeding. The Com-
mission stated:
The power of the Commission to prescribe rules of practice and to
4 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1978).
5 Apart from the above provisions for disciplinary action pursuant to administrative adjudi-
cation, Rule 2(e) (2) provides for suspension without a Commission hearing where an
accountant's state license to practice has been revoked or suspended or where the accountant
has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. In addition Rule
2(e) (3) provides for temporary suspension without hearing where an accountant has been
found by a court in an injunctive proceeding to have violated the federal securities laws. Such
suspension becomes permanent in 30 days if not objected to by the accountant. In the event
of such objection an accountant is entitled to a hearing at which the accountant may only
present mitigating evidence why the penalty of suspension or revocation ought not to be im-
posed. Moreover, and most significant, this rule applies even if the injunctive proceedings
ended in a consent decree by which the accountant did not admit the facts alleged in the
complaint. In such a situation the accountant "shall be presumed for all purposes... to have
been enjoined by reason of the misconduct alleged in the complaint." Rule 2(e) (3) (ii). Thus,
under this irrebutable presumption of guilt, an accountant may only offer evidence on the issue
of the sanction to be imposed-a highly questionable deprivation of due process. See note 53
infra.
6 1 Fed. Reg. 1753 (1936). Although this article is addressed solely to the current appli-
cation of 2(e) involving accountants, which has been the most actively besieged profession
under the rule, it should be noted that the rule also applies by its terms to "attorneys," "engi-
neers," or "other experts." In addition, the Commission 'has demonstrated a willingness to
actively regulate the legal profession. See the 2(e) proceedings against attorneys in M. J.
Melrose, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,578; Jo'M. Ferguson,
5 SEC Docket 37 (1974); Emanuel Fields, 2 SEC Docket 3 (1973); In Re William R. Carter,
484 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at F-1 (March 14, 1979).
7 3 S.E.C. 267 (1938).
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admit as attorneys or agents only those applicants who measure up to certain
standards is clear. . . . A corollary of the power to make such rules and to
erect such standards is the power to suspend or disbar for misconduct.8
Shortly thereafter, in June 1938,9 Rule 2 (e) ( 1 ) was adopted in substantially
similar form to its present-day prescriptions, with the exception that the subsec-
tion of the rule covering disciplinary actions of willful violations of the federal
securities laws was added in 1971 .L
From the inception of the rule in 1935 and its amendments, the Commis-
sion has grounded its authorization to promulgate Rule 2(e) on the general
statutory authority conferred upon the Commission to "make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary ... for the execution of the functions vested in
[it] . .. by this title."" At no time has the Commission claimed to have express
statutory authority to regulate professionals practicing before it. In its public
statements the "SEC agrees that it has no explicit authority for promulgating
Rule 2 (e) but insists that it has implicit authority under its general rulemaking
power to do so.""
Thus, it is from this meager and vague statutory underpinning that the
Commission has commenced its program of significant regulation and intrusion
into the day-to-day affairs of the accounting profession-a program which has
evoked direct challenge to the Commission's authority. In Touche Ross & Co. v.
SEC, the plaintiffs, the entire public accounting firm and three of its former
partners, sought to enjoin the Commission from conducting the first public 2 (e)
proceeding."3
Touche confronted head-on the Commission's authority to subject ac-
countants to administrative proceedings and sanctions, noting the absence of
express authority and the Supreme Court's clear statement that:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal
statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power
to make law-for no such power can be delegated by Congress-but the
power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as ex-
pressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do this, but operates
to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity [citations
omitted]. And not only must a regulation, in order to be valid, be con-
sistent with the statute, but it must be reasonable. 4
Touche observed that in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder"s the Supreme Court re-
8 Id. at 269 n.2.
9 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 1759 (June 27, 1938).
10 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9164 (May 10, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 78,064.
11 Securities Exchange Act § 23(a); Securities Act § 19(a).
12 Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,415 at 93,500
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). See SEC Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss in Touche Ross v.
SEC at 17.
13 Touche's Complaint filed on October 12, 1976, set out at [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,742.
14 Manhattan Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). See also Stark v. Wickard, 321
U.S. 288, 309 (1944); Campbell v. Long & Co., 281 U.S. 610 (1930); United States v. Silva,
272 F. Supp. 46 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
15 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
[June 1979]
jected an effort to expand the SEC's Rule 10b-5 beyond the explicit statutory
provisions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, holding that: "The
rule-making power granted to an administrative agency charged with the admin-
istration of a Federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is 'the
power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed
by the statute.' "16
Against this backdrop of utter absence of authority to discipline accountants,
Touche pointed out that where Congress intended to grant such disciplinary
power to agencies, Congress has been explicit," and that Congress has carefully
circumscribed the SEC's disciplinary authority by limiting it expressly to censure
or suspension of the registration of securities brokers or dealers.' The plaintiffs
further noted that the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts indicate that
Congress considered and rejected a proposal to place with the then proposed
Securities Regulatory Commission the power to license and discipline accoun-
tants. 9
In response to these contentions, the district court held that pursuant to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies it would not intervene in the
SEC's proceeding absent a clear showing "that the agency has acted in flagrant
violation of its statutory authority."2 The court held that under this test the
SEC's action was not improper, grounding its ruling on two questionable bases:
(1) the "forty-year history of the rule" during which no court found the rule
to be without statutory basis;2  and (2) a line of decisions, beginning with Gold-
smith v. Board of Tax Appeals,2" involving the "inherent power" of an adjudica-
tive body to promulgate rules disciplining professionals who practice in proceed-
ings before them.2
With respect to the Court's initial ground for decision, it is specious to sug-
gest that unauthorized Commission activity becomes authorized through passagd
of time and in the absence of judicial dissent. Indeed, the fact that no court
has squarely found that the Commission has such authority to act under Rule
2(e), despite opportunities to so hold, 4 suggests an apprehension by the courts
16 Id. at 213-14 (quoting Manhattan Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936)).
17 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 52(f) (1971), empowering Comptroller General to make rules and
regulations concerning practice of attorneys before the GAO, and similar such explicit grants
of power to the Treasury (31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1971)), and Commissioner of Patents (35 U.S.C.
§ 31 (1971)).
18 Securities Exchange Act, § 15(b) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) (1978), expressly grants
the SEC the power, after notice and hearing, "to censure, place limitations on the activities,
functions or operations of [or] suspend . . . or revoke the registration of any broker or
dealer. .. ."
19 Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1933).
20 [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,500.
21 Id. at 93,502.
22 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
23 [Current] FED. S c. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415, at 93,501.
24 See Emanuel Fields v. SEC 594 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d
956 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Schwebel v. Orrick, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also the letter
of comment 'by the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities which questions the
SEC's 2(e) authority:
While the Commission, of course, has a clear statutory mandate to regulate the
securities industry, its statutory authority to regulate the professionals practicing
before it is at least doubtful. Rule 2(e) is based solely on the Commission's general
rule-making authority; it has never been confirmed by the courts and the existence
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that the Commission's 2 (e) authority is questionable.
Likewise, the Court's reliance on Goldsmith and its progeny is not necessarily
compelling or dispositive since that case dealt with the inherent power of the
statutory antecedent to the tax court, the Board of Tax Appeals, to promulgate
rules of practice governing proceedings before it pursuant to a statute which
provided that such proceedings "shall be conducted in accordance with such
rules of evidence and procedure as the board may prescribe."25 There the tax
board denied the application for admission of an accountant previously found
guilty of improper conduct as examiner of municipal accounts in the Office of
Comptroller of the State of New York. The Supreme Court affirmed the tax
board's refusal of admission, observing that the tax board was vested with such
power by the statute authorizing it to prescribe the procedure pursuant to which
it operates.
To the extent that Goldsmith holds that an agency vested with rulemaking
and investigatory functions has inherent power to regulate professionals appear-
ing in proceedings before it, it is plain that Goldsmith should not support the
further contention that such inherent power to regulate extends to activities far
beyond appearance before the SEC in a representative capacity. Thus, even
assuming that the district court's decision in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC can be
viewed as dispositive on the issue of the existence of Commission authority to
discipline professionals appearing before it, it provides little insight on the scope
of that authority.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit held that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable in regard
to consideration of the Commission's authority to promulgate Rule 2(e).26 The
Second Circuit held that the Commission had 2(e) authority relying not only
on the district court's reasoning but also on the following factors: ( 1 ) "appellants
concede that there is no express statutory prohibition against promulgation of the
Rule ; ' '21a (2) "The Commission, through its Rule 2(e) proceeding, is merely
attempting to preserve the integrity of its own procedures, by assuring the fitness
of those professionals who represent others before the Commission. Indeed, the
Commission has made it clear that its intention in promulgating Rule 2(e) was
not to utilize the rule as an additional weapon in its enforcement arsenal, but
rather to determine whether a person's professional qualifications, including his
character and integrity, are such that he is fit to appear and practice before the
as well as the scope of that authority is unclear. In the absence of any clear mandate
the Commission should act in this field with particular restraint and in no event
subject attorneys to any adverse consequences without a full opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing and argument.
Up until now, Rule 2 (e) has been used sparingly and Commission decisions under
the Rule have been considered only twice by the courts and the ultimate question of
the Commission's power to proceed under the Rule remains undecided....
258 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at F-I (June 26, 1974).
25 270 U.S. at 121.
26 Docket No. 78-6095 (2d Cir., May 10, 1979), 5-11. The district court's ruling was
limited to the question of the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and thus "without reaching the substantive question of the validity of Rule 2(e), the
court holds that Touche Ross must first exhaust its administrative remedies." FED. SEC. REP.
(CCH) f 96,503.
26a Docket No. 78-6095 (2d Cir., May 10, 1979) at 13 (emphasis added).
[June 1979]
Commission ;,,26b and (3) "an examination of the policies underlying the securities
laws indicates that, contrary to appellants' assertions, the Rule is not inconsistent
with the Commision's statutory authority.
26
C
Thus, by amalgamation of these factors the Second Circuit upheld the
Commission's power to promulgate 2 (e) under its general rulemaking authority,
stating:
To summarize: we reject appellants' assertion that the Commission
acted without authority in promulgating Rule 2(e). Although there is no
express statutory provision authorizing the Commission to discipline profes-
sionals appearing before it, Rule 2 (e), promulgated pursuant to its statutory
rulemaking authority, represents an attempt by the Commission to protect
the integrity of its own processes. It provides the Commission with the means
to ensure that those professionals, on whom the Commission relies heavily
in the performance of its statutory duties, perform their tasks diligently and
with a reasonable degree of competence. As such the Rule is "reasonably
related" to the purposes of the securities laws. Mourning v. Family Publi-
cations Service, Inc., supra. Moreover, we hold that the Rule does not violate,
nor is it inconsistent with, any other provision of the securities laws. We
therefore sustain the validity of the Rule as a necessary adjunct to the Com-
mission's power to protect the integrity of its administrative procedures and
the public in general. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra. 26d
The Second Circuit's opinion is at best a "Catch 22" conundrum, and at
worst is an endorsement of a variant of the Commission's "effect-oriented ap-
proach" to promulgating rules under the securities acts which the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.26"
The absence of a statute prohibiting the promulgation of 2 (e) should hardly
26b Id. (emphasis added).
26c Id. at 14. It is submitted that the "policies" argument in support of the SEC's position
is not unlike the argument made by the SEC Amicus Brief filed in Hochfelder which was
rejected by the Supreme Court. (See footnote 26e infra.)
26d Id. at 18.
26e See the SEC's Amicus Brief filed in the Supreme Court in Hochfelder v. Ernst &
Ernst, 10-12, where the Commission argued that section 10(h), and thus Rule lOb-5, prohibited
negligent conduct since "[t]here is nothing in this broad language that limits its prohibitions to
'manipulative or deceptive' practices that are done intentionally," and because the effect of such
an approach would be consistent with the "congressional purpose in the legislation to provide
investors with the broadest possible protection." The 'Court rejected the SEC's approach,
stating:
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission contends that nothing in the
language "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" limits its operation to
knowing or intentional practices. In support of its view, the Commission cites the
overall congressional purpose in the 1933 and 1934- Acts to protect. investors against
false and deceptive practices that might injure them. See Affiliated Ute Citizens u.
United States, supra, at 151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., supra, at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964). See also
SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bur., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). The Commission then
reasons that since the "effect" upon investors of given conduct is the same regardless
of whether the conduct is negligent or intentional, Congress must have intended to
bar all such practices and not just those done knowingly or intentionally. The logic
of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for wholly faultless conduct
where such conduct results in harm to investors, a result the Commission would be
unlikely to support. But apart from where its logic might lead, the Commission
would add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its
commonly accepted meaning.
425 U. S. at 197-98.
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be the passkey for justifying such a rule without explicit authorization. Similarly,
the Commission's intent in promulgating the rule is scarcely relevant to Congress'
intent which has been explicit in granting disciplinary and enforcement power to
the Commission."' Moreover, the court of appeals' acceptance of the argument
that 2(e) is not "an additional weapon in [the SEC's] enforcement arsenal"
ignores the realities of the Commission's present-day use of, and statements regard-
ing, the rule. Sg
By upholding the validity of Rule 2 (e) on the basis that it is " 'reasonably
related' to the purposes of the securities laws,"27 the Second Circuit has distorted
the governing standard which allows an agency to exercise rulemaking authority
which "constitutes a 'legitimate, reasonable and direct adjunct to the Commis-
sion's explicit statutory power.' "_-7 The only explicit statutory power upon which
the Commission has grounded 2 (e) is its general rulemaking authority which by
its terms merely grants the Commission power to promulgate rules "as may be
necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this title for which [it is]
responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in [it] by this title.
"s27b
Thus, the Commission's rulemaking power extends no further than the express
statutory provisions of the securities acts which, as the Second Circuit concedes,
"contain no express statutory provision authorizing the Commission to discipline
professionals appearing before it."
' C
Equally erroneous is the Second Circuit's justification of authority on the
basis that 2(e) "represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the integ-
rity of its own processes" and "as such the Rule is 'reasonably related' to the
purposes of the securities laws." That the rule is reasonably related to, or in
furtherance of the purposes of the securities acts, should not of itself be the
litmus test for under such an "effect-oriented approach," there would seldom,
if ever, be a situation where the Commission, either with or without explicit
power, promulgates a rule which is contrary to, or inconsistent with, the purposes
of the securities acts or the integrity of its processes. Such an approach would be
tantamount to granting the Commission the power to make laws, not merely
rules.rd
26f Supra text at notes 17-19; infra text at notes 32-34.
26g Infra text at notes 39-47 and 56-63. The Court of Appeal's acceptance, per the
opinion of Judge Timbers, of the Commission's argument cannot be attributed to any un-
familiarity with the Commission's use of Rule 2(e) on the part of Judge Timbers, a former SEC
General Counsel.
27 Docket No. 78-6095 (2d Cir., May 10, 1979), at 18.
27a Id. at 14 (emphasis added); Trans Alaska Pipeline Rates Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 655
(1978); Mouring v. Family Publications Services, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
27b Supra, note 11 (emphasis added).
27c Docket No. 78-6095 (2d Cir., May 10, 1979), at 18.
27d See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., [Current] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,766 at
95,006 (9th 'Cir. 1979), where the Ninth Circuit in an enforcement action refused to hold
that the Commission had power over auditors where such authority was lacking, holding:
To accept the SEC's position would go far toward making the accountant both
an insurer of his client's honesty and an enforcement arm of the SEC. We can under-
stand why the SEC wishes to so conscript accountants. Its frequently late arrival
on the scene of fraud and violations of securities laws almost always suggests that
had it been there earlier with the accountant it would have caught the scent of
wrongdoing and, after an unrelenting hunt, bagged the game. What it cannot do,
the thought goes, the accountant can and should. The difficulty with this is that
Congress has not enacted the conscription bill that the SEC seeks to have us fashion
and fix as an interpretive gloss on existing securities laws.
[June 1979]
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Apart from the Second Circuit's feeble attempt to find explicit authority,
the court expressly disclaims any opinion regarding the scope of that authority, 27
or the due process standards which must attend such proceedings,2 7' holding
that these are questions which may be raised only after Touche has exhausted
its administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the decisions in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC cannot be viewed
as strong or persuasive affirmations of authority for expansive application of
Rule 2 (e), but instead should be viewed as mandating that the Commission act
with restraint. Rule 2 (e) proceedings in recent years reflect that both the Com-
mission's means and objectives in implementing Rule 2(e) have been anything
but restrained. 7 g
27e The court stated: "Accordingly, we wish to make it clear that Touche Ross must
exhaust their administrative remedies by submitting to the Rule 2(e) proceeding before we
will consider any challenges which they may assert with respect to any disciplinary action
that the Commission may determine is appropriate under the circumstances." Docket No.
78-6095 (2d Cir., May 10, 1979), at 6.
The Court also raised for the SEC's consideration the question of whether the SEC's
Rule 2(e) authority may be extended to discipline an entire public accounting firm for the
acts of a few of its members, stating:
Touche Ross chose to remain loyal to its retired partners and to challenge Rule 2(e)
in a broadside attack on the right of the Commission to discipline anyone. Our
opinion today rejects this sally. Nothing in the complaint, or the district court pro-
ceedings, or the briefs and oral argument before us purports to raise the question of
the extent to which the Commission has the power, in a disciplinary action, to hold
Touche Ross and its 525 partners vicariously liable to the extent of permanent
revocation of the rights to practice for the acts of its erstwhile partners. It may be
argued, for example, that the Commission may not proceed against Touche Ross
on a theory of respondent superior without first establishing that 'Congress has dele-
gated such authority and that the Commission has, through a rulemaking proceed-
ing, set standards for such an adjudication, including a definition of "willful conduct"
by organizations. . . . We express no view on this question, but it is one that the
Commission might want to consider. In any event, since it is far from clear that the
Commission will in fact determine to discipline Touche Ross, and since the question
was not raised before the Commission or this court, the resolution of such issues
should await the conclusion of the administrative process.
Id. at 21.
27f The court held that "appellants must exhaust their administrative remedies before
they attempt to obtain judicial review of their other claims, including their claim that the
Commission is acting with bias and will not afford them a fair hearing in accordance with due
process." Id. at 19.
27g Apart from Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, a SEC administrative law judge has ad-
dressed the issue of the Commission's 2(e) authority in In Re William R. Carter, SEC Admin-
istrative Proceeding File No. 3-5464, which involved two attorneys. In an Initial Decision
rendered March 7, 1979, the administrative law judge held that the Commission had juris-
diction to discipline attorneys under Rule 2(e) and rejected the attorneys' claim that the
prohibitions of Rule 2(e) are unconstitutionally vague. 494 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at
F-14 (March 14, 1979). See note 81 infra.
It is more than possible that the Second Circuit's and administrative law judge's convic-
tion that there exists 2(e) authority may not be shared by all courts or all members of the
Commission. See SEC v. Arthur Young, discussed in note 27d supra.
In a recent speech SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel, in criticizing the Commission for
failing to observe the limits of the agency's power, stated:
In practice, however, I believe the Commission has been paying insufficient
attention to the jurisdictional limitations of an administrative agency. In particular,
I have dissented from the Commission's use of Section 21(A) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to publicize the termination of enforcement investigations.
I believe that such publicity is being used as a sanction and that the Commission
only has the jurisdiction to impose sanctions by way of the disciplinary proceedings
specifically set forth in the securities laws. I have similar doubts about the Com-
mission's authority to imply proceedings against professionals under Rule 2(e) of
the Commission's Rules of Practice.
Karmel, Jurisdictional Concerns in Securities Law Enforcement, February 23, 1979. Coin-
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III. Implementation of Rule 2(e)
The more expansive the Commission's application of Rule 2(e) the more
pernicious becomes the deprivation of due process which results in such proceed-
ings where the SEC is not only the investigator but the prosecutor and judge as
well. h Moreover, the "rudimentary requirements of fair play"'  which must
attend any administrative adjudication are called into question when it becomes
clear that the SEC is utilizing a Rule 2(e) proceeding to accomplish indirectly
that which it is expressly prohibited from doing directly under the explicit
provisions of the federal securities laws.
Unlike the statutory requirements for compliance with section 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5 of the 1934 Act,29 and the body of judicial precedents which have
fleshed out those requirements, there are few, if any, requirements or standards
which provide an accountant with sufficient notice of what constitutes "requisite
qualifications to represent others"3 ° or what the SEC might deem "improper
professional conduct"'" in a given situation.
Indeed, the one aspect of Rule 2 (e) which provides some measure of norma-
tive conduct, namely, the prohibition on willful violation of the securities laws,32
has been seldom used in 2 (e) proceedings. The reason for the minimal use of this
provision of 2(e) may be due to the fact that it is contrary to the express stat-
utory provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts which grant the federal courts the
exclusive power to try actions brought by the SEC for alleged violations of the
securities laws by an accountant. Specifically, section 21(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides that if it appears to the Commission that "any
person is engaged or about to engage" in any violations of that Act, "it may in
its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States...
to enjoin such acts or practices,"33 and section 27 of the Exchange Act directs
missioner Karmel's frank admission that charges brought against professionals for " 'improper
or unethical' " actions "should be heard 'under the aegis of the federal courts,' not by the
commission itself," is both refreshing and incisive. See SEC's Tough Case: New Commissioner
With Abrasive Style, Wall Street Journal, May 18, 1979, at 1, 14.
27h For a recent example of deprivation of due process caused by an Environmental
Protection Agency staff attorney's simultaneous actions as an "investigator," "prosecutor,"
"witness" and "judge," see United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., et al., No. 77 CR 1073
(N.D. Ill., April 20, 1979), where the district judge dismissed an indictment which was
procured by a "totality of grand jury abuse by government attorneys" (id. at 53), holding:
The indictment was returned by a grand jury that had an attorney before it, pre-
senting the government's case while laboring under conflicts of interest. It heard a
government attorney who alternated his role as a prosecutor with that of an im-
portant witness, and then remained in the presence of the grand jury. This attorney
was a person who was not authorized to be in the grand jury room; his presence
there voids the indictment in this case, even without a showing of prejudice ...
Moreover, and firming the balance toward dismissal of this indictment, the evidence
shows a totality of grand jury abuse by government attorneys, circumstances of
prosecutor conduct that undermined the grand jury, destroyed its independence,
and deprived defendants of their Fifth Amendment rights. ...
Id. at 54.
28 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508
(1959); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14 (1938); Mack v. Florida State Board of
Dentistry, 296 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
30 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(i) (1978).
31 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1978).
32 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(iii) (1978).
33 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1971).
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that: "The district courts of the United States . shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
. . . actions at Law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
title. . . ."" Thus, the securities acts clearly contemplate that the SEC shall
bring any claim for securities laws violations in federal court and not before
itself.3 5
Beyond the foregoing infirmities of due process under Rule 2(e), the pos-
sibility exists under the standards of the rule and the Commission's application
thereof, that a Rule 2(e) proceeding may be adjudicated without regard to any
standard of culpability or without regard to proof of fault on the part of the
accounting practitioner. The Commission has long held that it need not prove
scienter in a 2(e) proceeding. In The Matter of Haskins & Sells,36 it held:
We accept respondents' assertion that they acted in good faith and
accordingly do not find any willfulness in the sense referred to by them.
However, in a disciplinary action under Rule II(e) we are not required to
make such a finding. We are of the opinion that respondents' accounting
work in connection with the Thomascolor registration statement was so
deficient in the respects set forth above, as a result of their failure to give
this professional undertaking the degree of care and inquiry it demanded
under the circumstances, that disciplinary action is required.
3 7
Moreover, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder the Commission's General Counsel clearly stated that which had
become the Commission's apparent practice in 2(e) proceedings-simple neg-
ligence would serve as an appropriate basis to a finding of violation of 2 (e). The
Commission's General Counsel observed in a memorandum "8 to the Chairman
of the SEC which analyzed Hochfelder that the Supreme Court's decision
strongly implied that the Commission would need to prove scienter in future
injunctive actions brought under Rule 10b-5, and that as a result, "it may be
appropriate for the Commission to place greater reliance upon Rule 2 (e) in the
future as a means of preventing a recurrence of unethical or improper conduct.' ' "r
In a subsequent memorandum to the Chairman, the General Counsel stated:
There may be cases where, as a consequence of Hochfelder, negligent
conduct by an accountant or attorney which injured investors may not con-
stitute a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, nor otherwise violate
the securities laws, yet represent a substantial threat to the public interest if
such conduct were to continue in the future. If this conduct would amount
to a significant deviation from professional standards, a proceeding under
Rule 2(e) to test the individual's fitness to continue to be permitted to
practice before the Commission might be appropriate. 0
34 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1971).
35 See also Securities Act §§ 20(b) and 22(a). The only exception to this scheme of
exclusive jurisdiction is the express authority granted to the Commission to conduct disciplinary
proceedings against broker-dealers. See note 18 supra.
36 Accounting Series Release No. 73 (1952), 5 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 72,088.
37 Id. at 62,197.
38 Memorandum to Chairman Hills, June 8, 1976, Staff Study, Senate Subcommittee on
Reports, Accounting and Management, Appendix I (1976).
39 Id. at 1472 n.2.
40 SEC Office Memorandum, August 27, 1976, Staff Study, Senate Subcommittee on
Reports, Accounting and Management, Appendix I, at 1508 (1976).
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It appears clear therefore that the Commission views 2 (e) as a means whereby
it may accomplish indirectly that which Hochfelder has arguably foreclosed it
from doing directly.4' The Commission's public 2 (e) proceeding against Touche
Ross & Co. stands as testimony to this fact.
There, instead of joining Touche in an injunctive action, which was brought
against certain other defendants related to the audit client,4" the Commission
chose to commence a 2 (e) proceeding and thereby avoid the risk that it would
be held to the scienter standard of culpability. Nowhere in the order instituting
the 2(e) proceeding does the Commission allege that Touche Ross had any
intent to deceive or defraud in connection with the audits it performed. More-
over, by announcing publicly the commencement of the 2(e) proceeding the
Commission did not deprive itself of the benefit, from a settlement standpoint,
which usually attends an injunctive action resulting from the publicity adverse
to the professional.4
In addition to avoiding the scienter requirement, a 2(e) proceeding
also avoids the further judicial requirement that an injunction should not
be entered and sanctions granted where there has been no showing by the
Commission of the likelihood of any further violations or wrongdoing by the
accounting firm." Under Rule 2(e) the Commission has not encumbered itself
41 For decisions holding that the SEC must prove scienter in an enforcement action under
Rule lOb-5 see SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 439 F. Supp. 820, 825 (W.D. La. 1977);
SEC v. Am. Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). But see
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 709-10 (D.D.C. 1978), where the
court sets forth those authorities which hold that scienter is not a necessary element of proof
in an enforcement action.
42 SEC v. Giant Stores Corp., Civ. No. 76-164 (D.D.C. 1976).
43 In Re Touche Ross & Co., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-5075, Order of Sep-
tember 2, 1976.
In certain 2(e) proceedings it is questionable whether the Commission's contentions that
an accountant was negligent would pass muster under judicial standards of due diligence and
reasonable care. Indeed, in many 2(e) proceedings the Commission merely states that an
accountant has engaged in "improper professional conduct" by virtue of some Commission-
determined departure from generally accepted auditing standards, and without elaboration or
specific analysis or findings which clearly indicate that such departure was due to negligence
or some level of conduct amounting to fault. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, Accounting Series Re-
lease No. 248 (1978), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) J 72,270; Haskins & Sells, Accounting
Series Release No. 241 (1978), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,263. To be sure, the failure
of an accountant to comply with generally accepted auditing standards, even under the Com-
mission's view of those standards, is not necessarily tantamount to a lack of due diligence on the
part of the professional. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CER-
TIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, Rule 202, 2 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) § 202.
44 That this benefit is considerable has not gone unnoticed by one Chairman of the SEC
who observed that "if the proceeding is disposed of at the very time that it is begun, there
normally will be only one round of adverse publicity. Otherwise, there may be two - or more.
Lawyers should think about such things." Address by Garrett, A Look at the SEC's Adminis-
trative Practice (August 25, 1974) (address to Southwestern Legal Foundation).
See also the dissenting statement of Commissioner Roberta Karmel to the Commission's
practice of publicizing investigative repdrts where she states that "publication by the Com-
mission under Section 21(a) of a negotiated statement by a person under investigation setting
forth admissions and undertakings constitutes, in effect, a sanction," and observes:
I subscribe to the objective of making available and disclosing information in a
simple and effective way as long as it does not ignore the harm that can be inflicted
upon an individual by publication directed by a governmental agency.
Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15664 (March 21, 1979, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,015. See note 27g supra.
45 See SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,766 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. National Student Mar-
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with such a requirement in determining whether sanctions are appropriate.46
Moreover, since the Commission's sanctions under 2(e) are severe-temporary
or permanent suspension from practice before the Commission-it effectively has
at its command a range of sanctions, to be secured through settlements, which
may be more far-reaching than the ancillary relief afforded by the courts in in-
junctive proceedings.1
7
Apart from these substantive infirmities in the means by which 2(e) is
implemented there are also certain procedural aspects of 2 (e) proceedings which
underscore the unfairness of its present usage as a vehicle to discipline and
regulate the accounting profession. Unlike a judicial proceeding, discovery in a
2(e) proceeding is not a matter of right but is subject to the discretionary ap-
proval of the administrative law judge, and in no event is the permissible scope
of discovery as broad as that allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure."'
The rules of evidence employed in 2 (e) proceedings are less rigorous than the
governing rules of evidence in judicial proceedings. 9 As a result inherently unre-
liable hearsay and conjectural evidence are likely to be admitted and utilized as a
basis for decision-making." Related to the quality of the evidence is the fact
that although the SEC's staff has the burden of proof in a 2(e) proceeding, it
is a burden which in the Commission's view may be satisfied by a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence5' and not by clear and convincing evidence, which
keting Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc. [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,756 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 575 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978).
46 In many 2(e) proceedings the Commission applies sanctions applicable to the nation-
wide practice of an accounting firm despite the Commission's acknowledgement that the
alleged audit transgressions relate to a small percentage of the total number of audit engage-
ments properly performed. See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, -Mitchell & Co., Accounting Series Release
No. 173 (1975), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1[ 72,195 at 62,455; Seidman & Seidman,
Accounting Series Release No. 196 (1976), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. ('CCH) 11 72,218 at 62,542.
See note 81 infra, for a discussion of the recent 2(e) order in In Re William R. Carter,
where despite the absence of evidence to infer that the attorneys discinlined there were likely
to engage in future misconduct (indeed, the evidence indicated that they were eminently quali-
fied SEC practitioners with ho previous "blemishes" on their records), the administrative law
judge ordered that they should be suspended from all SEC practice for periods of one year and
nine months, respectively, 494 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at F-1, F-15 (March 14, 1979).
47 See SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1978) where the court stated
that:
The principal purpose of this type of injunction is, of course, to deter future
violations, and not to punish the violator. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329
(1944). Furthermore, an injunction against violation of the reporting provisions does
not ipso facto involve a deprivation of livelihood, and, as a practical matter, would
not be nearly as extensive an impairment to Zimmerman as a revocation would be to
a broker-dealer.
48 Compare SEC Rule of Practice 15, 17 C.F.R. 201.15 (1978), with FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b), 28 U.S.C. § 26(b) (1970). See also In Re Ernst & Ernst, Accounting Series Release
No. 248 (1978), 5 FwD. SEC. L. REP. 1 72,270 (CCH), at 62,731-732; The Report of the Com-
mission's Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices, June 1972, 158 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 11 (June 28, 1972).
49 See SEC Rule of Practice 14, 17 C.F.R. 201.14 (1978).
50 See Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where the court reversed a 2(e)
disciplinary order against an attorney which was grounded on rank hearsay and speculative
evidence. See also in Re William R. Carter, 484 SEc. REG. L. REP. (BNA) at F-1, F-14
(March 14, 1979), and note 81 infra.
51 See, e.g., Joseph H. Van Dorn, 3 S.E.C. 267, 272 (1938). See the SEC disciplinary
proceeding in Boston Co. Inst. Investors, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) If 81,705
at 80,818 n.6 (1978) where the Commission specifically refused to apply the clear and con-
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is the governing standard in judicial proceedings where the "heavy sanction" of
"deprivation of livelihood" may be imposed. s2
Thus, a 2(e) proceeding is devoid of more than just an independent jurist
attired in a black robe. As the foregoing indicates, many of the fundamental
attributes of due process which attend judicial proceedings under the securities
acts are totally lacking. In many types of administrative proceedings this would
be objectionable. In this type of proceeding, which is tantamount to a "quasi-
criminal proceeding" with the deleterious consequences of impugning the ac-
countant's professional reputation and depriving him of his livelihood, the
absence of fundamental concepts of fair play and due process is highly question-
able."
IV. Rule 2 (e) Objectives
Beyond the Commission's facile and often-repeated statement that the
objective of 2(e) proceedings is "to protect the public and the integrity of the
Commission's own processes from incompetent, unethical or dishonest attorneys,
accountants and other professionals and experts,"' 4 there exist questions as to
what are the specific objectives of the SEC and its staff in administering 2(e),
and the effect of those objectives on the accounting profession as a whole.
At the outset of the Commission's increased enforcement activity under
2 (e), the Commission and its staff denied that:
[I]t is the ultimate design of the Commission to create situations which
would result in all the "Big Eight" being under . . . review procedures
[monitored by the Commission]. Nothing could be further from the truth.
There is no such plan or intent. As proceedings develop we will deal with
them one a a time, without plan or design to subject the profession to the
thumb of the Commission."s
Subsequent statements and actions by the Commission cast doubt on the
notion that the present-day objective of the Commission is not to subjugate the
accounting profession to the Commission's day-to-day control. In a memorandum
to the SEC's Chairman," the Commission's General Counsel observed:
vincing standard which the District of Columbia Circuit held was applicable in such proceed-
ings. See note 52 infra.
52 See SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Collins Sec. Corp.
v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1977); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457
F. Supp. 682, 701 n.43 (D.D.C. 1978).
53 See In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1968) ("Disbarment, designed to protect
the public is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer..., He is accordingly entitled to
procedural due process .... These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.");
Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("And contrary to the Commission's
concept, disciplinary proceedings 'are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature ...
[footnotes omitted]").
54 SEC Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss in Touche Ross v. SEC, at 5-6.
55 Gonson, Disciplinary Proceedings and Other Remedies Available to the SEC, 30 Bus.
LAW. 191, 197 (1975); Sommer, Accountants: A Flexible Standard, 1 LITIGATION 35, 37
(1975).
56 Memorandum to Chairman Williams, June 10, 1977, SEC Report to Congress on the
Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role, Exhibit W (July 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Williams Memorandum].
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Admiral Rickover suggests that the Commission, periodically, should
supervise audits of the performance of public accounting firms. Under its
existing authority, and particularly Rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice, the
Commission has, where it finds substandard, unprofessional or questionable
auditing practices, commenced and concluded disciplinary proceedings re-
quiring the firm, at its expense, to undergo an independent quality control
review. This approach has been employed in Commission disciplinary pro-
ceedings, involving some of the largest accounting firms, with the consent of
the firms named as respondents in those proceedings. Variations of this
procedure have also been used in settlements involving smaller accounting
firms. Although some accounting firms apparently might argue otherwise,
we believe the Commission's authority in this regard to be soundly based.
The Commission has the authority to preclude accounting firms from
practicing before it at all, and, accordingly, has the authority to condition
an accounting firm's ability to practice before the Commission upon a
thorough review of the firn's practices and procedures, and an undertaking
by the firm to correct any deficiencies highlighted by such a review.
While the Commission's authority would, in our view, permit the Com-
mission itself to conduct this review of an accounting firm's performance and
quality controls as Admiral Rickover has suggested, such an approach would
be costly, time-consuming, and likely a less effective allocation of the Com-
mission's limited resources in light of the results achieved in the cases dis-
cussed above, where the profession has undertaken to review its own per-
formance, subject to Commission oversight. In these cases, of course, a con-
dition of the settlement has been that the review performed be satisfactory to
the Commission.
Finally, Admiral Rickover suggested that, in the event an accounting
firm does not meet minimum standards of professional performance and
independence, the Commission should suspend the firm or revoke its license
to audit publicly-held companies. This of course, is the function of Rule
2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.
57
The strongest evidence of the Commission's intention is the compiled record
of the Commission's significant and "inordinate intrusion of government into
professional activity.""8 With few exceptions, virtually all the large public ac-
counting firms practicing before the Commission have been the subject of recent
2(e) proceedings and have succumbed to some form of sanctions with continuing
Commission oversight, including:
(a) the undertaking of peer reviews and quality control inspections
which are subject to Commission approval and oversight;"
(b) imposition of continuing education requirements;6"
(c) prohibitions on a partner participating in a finr's activities in
a partnership capacity;6"
57 Id. at 989-91 (footnotes omitted).
58 Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L.
Rxv. 31, 63-64 (1975).
59 See, e.g., Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, Accounting Series Release No. 144
(1973), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,166; S. D. Leidesdorf & Co., Accounting Series Re-
lease No. 209 (1977), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,231; Price Waterhouse & Co., Account-
ing Series Release No. 238 (1978), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,238; In Re Haskins &
Sells, Accounting Series Release No. 241 (1978) FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,263.
60 In Re Benjamin Botwinick & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 168 (1975), 5 Fra.




(d) prohibitions on undertaking new business; notification of
prospective clients of the SEC's findings;62
(e) restrictions on a firm's merger activities; and inducements for
a firm to merge with a larger firm. 3
Although the above sanctions may be viewed as untoward by only those to
whom the sanction applies, 4 the one sanction which appears most nettlesome to
the accounting profession as a whole is the SEC's involvement in these proceed-
ings in the ad hoc promulgation and implementation of what it views as generally
accepted auditing standards.
That the Commission's regulatory effort in such situations is intrusive is
clearly undeniable.6" More important, however, is whether the Commission's
ad hoc promulgation of generally accepted auditing standards is either authorized
by statute or desirable.
Unlike the Commission's explicit statutory power to promulgate accounting
principles generally acceptable in SEC practice,6" the Commission's power to
promulgate auditing standards generally acceptable to SEC practice is notably
absent from the securities acts.67 Despite the absence of express authority, the
Commission finds such authority not only in the recesses of its antifraud authority
and authority to define independence, but also as a part of its authority under
Rule 2(e)," which is itself highly suspect. Thus, the Commission's General
Counsel has stated that:
In addition to its antifraud and definitional powers, Rule 2(e), as noted
above, provides a ready vehicle for Commission articulation of standards of
auditing practice not just as a means of treating specific instances of un-
professional or improper conduct, but also as a means, through the pub-
lication of its dispositions of such Rule 2(e) proceedings, of offering
guidance to all auditors for their future audits.6 9
Apart from the Commission's authority to promulgate auditing standards
there remains the question of the desirability of the Commission's enactment of
such standards. The means by which the Commission "promulgates" auditing
standards is, by the Commission's own concession, on an "ad hoc" basis through
62 In Re Touche Ross & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 153 (1974), 5 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) f 72,175; In Re Loux Gose & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 160 (1974), 5
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,182.
63 Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, at note 59 supra; Wertheimer, Fine, Berger
& Co., Accounting Series Release No. 167 (1974), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,189.
64 The peer review of Peat Marwick, the cost of which was borne by Peat, "assertedly cost
over $1 million, arid required in excess of 14,000 man hours." See Williams Memorandum,
note 56 supra, at 990 n.18.
65 For example, as a result of its proceedings against Peat and Touche, the Commission has
injected itself into the process of drafting accounting firm audit manuals for those firms. Like-
wise, pursuant to the order entered in the proceeding against Laventhol, that firm was required
to secure Commission and court approval to change audit procedures reflected in the firm's
manual. See Bialkin, Sanctions Against Accountants, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 823, 829 (1975).
66 Securities Act § 19 (a); Securities Exchange Act §§ 3(b), 12(b)(1), 13(b) and 23(a).
67 For the classic discussion on the SEC's authority to promulgate auditing standards, see
Strother, The Establishment of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and Generally Ac-
cepted Auditing Standards, 28 VAND. L. REv. 201, 225 (1975).
68 Memorandum to Chairman Williams, note 56 supra, at 997 n.33.
69 Id. at n.33.
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the medium of a 2 (e) proceeding."0 Thus the procedures which would normally
attend the enactment of a Commission rule or regulation (or the enactment of an
auditing standard by the AICPA),7 including notice and publication of the
proposal and a period for comment, are absent.72 Accordingly, the expression of
such "guidance to all auditors for future audits," comes at the expense of the
professional reputation of some auditor who should have known what the
standards for "future audits" would be.7
Moreover, by making such proclamations of generally accepted auditing
standards without the benefit of the views of those who actually are engaged in
the day-to-day practice of auditing, the risk is created that a patently unrealistic
standard will be the guiding light for avoidance of disciplinary activity under
Rule 2 (e). The danger of such an approach is amply demonstrated by the Com-
mission's explication of an auditing standard in its 2 (e) proceeding in the Matter
of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,74 involving that firm's examination of Na-
tional Student Marketing Corporation. There the Commission suggests the ex-
70 Id. at 998.
71 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is the only national accounting
association whose membership is limited to certified public accountants. Because of its efforts
to promoze and maintain professional standards of practice, the AICPA has come to be accepted
as the authoritative source of auditing standards and procedures. See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur
Young & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766, n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) ; Hochfelder v.
Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185, reh. denied, 425 U.S. 986
(1976); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
934 (1976).
72 See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966); Pickus v. U.S. Board of
Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d
478, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1972); Texaco v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3rd Cir.
1969).
73 That this approach is "overly crude" has been conceded by no less an authority than an
SEC Chairman who stated:
I have observed in the past that I think our enforcement weapons may be overly
crude, or at least not well tuned to achieve our objective. The use of Rule 2 (e) has
theoretical attraction. In some cases it has clearly seemed like the appropriate remedy
with respect to lawyers whose sins have extended to misrepresentations if not out-
right lies in their dealings with the Commission itself. But I doubt whether it can
ever serve as an appropriate vehicle for enunciating professional guidelines.
Garrett, New Directions in Professional Responsibility, 29 Bus. LAw. 7, 12-13 (1974). Sim-
ilarly, see the petition to amend Rule 2(e) recently filed with the SEC by the Institute for
Public Interest Representation (May 25, 1978), which proposes that a whistle-blowing obliga-
tion be imposed on attorneys through an amendment to existing Rule 2(e), which the Institute
states (p. 9) :
While this rule is certainly worded broadly enough to reach the attorney who fails
to disclose his client's misrepresentations, there appear to be no cases in which an
attorney was disciplined for that reason. Moreover, the breadth of the rule is also
its primary drawback. It does not list any criteria by which the Commission is to
determine whether an attorney lacks the "requisite qualifications" or "character or
integrity" necessary to practice before the Commission. Nor does it define "unethical
or improper conduct." In short, the rule does not clearly inform the securities bar
what standards of conduct the Commission deems most important - one of which,
we submit, should be the requirement to reveal a client's fraud if perpetrated during
the course of the representation. Inasmuch as requirements of due process require
that any attorney to be disbarred or suspended for violation of a disciplinary rule have
advance notice that his particular course of conduct is improper, cf., In re Ruf-
falo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), the Commission may feel itself constrained to pursue only
the most flagrant abuses of ethical obligations through the general provisions of Rule
2(e) [footnote omitted].
See also the Report of SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure (November
1977) which recommends that the SEC discontinue its comparable practice of promulgating
disclosure rules through enforcement proceedings rather than rulemaking (at 328-29).
74 Accounting Series Release No. 173 (1975), 5 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 72,195.
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istence of a "whistle blowing" obligation7 5 in certain circumstances-an obliga-
tion which is not grounded on any ethical requirement," accounting principle,
auditing standard or judicial decision," and which was not subjected to the
benefits of scrutiny by auditing practitioners and others, who might have ad-
dressed the extent to which that standard would have a chilling effect on auditor-
client communications and could impair the entire audit process.
Indeed, the Commission's enunciation of this "auditing standard" totally
disregards the likelihood that application of such a standard would not only
result in an auditor being deprived of information by clients who would be
reticent to discuss questionable matters with a professional advisor compelled to
disclose such information to the SEC,78 but also creates the potential for the
75 Id. at 62,450-51.
76 Under the AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics, Rule 301, an accountant "shall not
disclose any confidential information obtained in the course of a professional engagement except
with the consent of the client." 2 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS'(CCH) ET § 301.
77 Indeed, contrary to the SEC's position, there is support in the case law for the general
proposition that an auditor's disclosure obligation terminates upon withdrawal and disassocia-
tion as auditor. See Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 19711); Katz v. Realty
Equities Corp., 406 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In Re Republic National Life Ins. Co.,
387 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gold v. DLC, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Seeburg-Commonwealth United Litigation, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,802 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Fisher v. Kletz, 226 F. Supp. 180, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
See also, Isbell, An Overview of Accountants' Duties and Liabilities Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-blowing, 35 OHIo ST. L. J. 261 (1974).
78 It cannot be gainsaid that to the extent that a client cannot be assured that confidences
reposed with a professional advisor will be safeguarded, the client will be less inclined to share
all its confidences with the professional advisor.
, See, e.g., the AICPA's Petition to the Internal Revenue Service, May 12, 1977, wherein
the AICPA opposed IRS efforts to obtain access to workpapers prepared for use by auditors
in analyzing the adequacy of contingent tax liabilities. In support of its Petition the AICPA
stated:
Successful demands by IRS for access to tax accrual working papers will cause a
breakdown in the vital free and candid exchange between client and auditor and
would seriously impair the ability of auditors to perform their principal role, the
expression of opinions on the fairness of clients' financial statements. [see page 6 of the
petition]
The public interest demands that the freedom of communication between auditor
and client remain unimpaired - not for the benefit of the company or its auditors,
but for the benefit of those in the economy who must have accurate and dependable
information. It is absolutely essential that the auditor must have complete and full
access to the client's financial transactions if he is to express an opinion on a client's
financial statements. Obviously this will include complete information with respect to
the provision for income taxes. If the IRS were granted free and unfettered access to
the working papers, the client's willingness to deal with the auditor completely and
frankly would be seriously and irreparably undermined. This breakdown in communi-
cations inevitably would result in a substantial number of CPAs opinions being quali-
fied as to scope, a result unacceptable to the SEC and clearly contrary to the public
interest. [see pages 13-14 of the petition]
The American Bar Association has expressed a similar concern regarding the inhibiting
effect on attorney-client communications resulting from "compelled" disclosure:
This vital confidentiality of consultation and advice [between lawyer and client]
would be destroyed or seriously impaired if it is accepted as a general principle that
lawyers must inform the SEC or others regarding confidential information received by
lawyers from their clients even though such action would not be permitted or required
by the CPR. Any such compelled disclosure would seriously and adversely affect the
ability of lawyers as advocates to represent and defend their clients' interests.
In light of the foregoing considerations, it must be recognized that a lawyer
cannot, consistently with his essential role as legal adviser, be regarded as a source
of information concerning possible wrongdoing by clients. Accordingly, any principle
of law which, except as permitted or required by the CPR, permits or obliges a lawyer
to disclose to the SEC otherwise confidential information, should be established only
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greater harm that clients might take active steps at intentionally concealing in-
formation from the auditor which might relate to possible sensitive and ques-
tionable matters.
Apart from creating a potentially unhealthy situation between the client
and auditor, the SEC's auditing standard unnecessarily places the onus for
whistle blowing on the auditor when in effect the auditing profession's existing
standards place such a burden on the client. If the client declines to make dis-
closures necessary to prevent its financial statements from being materially mis-
leading, and refuses to accept a qualified or disclaimed audit report, the auditor
is then compelled to withdraw from the engagement." In such circumstances
withdrawal by an auditor is tantamount to whistle blowing, and results from
the client's decision not to disclose. 0 Such a system, as created and applied by
by statute after full and careful consideration of the public interests involved, and
should be resisted unless clearly mandated by law.
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Report to House of Delegates, 31
Bus. LAw. 544 (1975).
See also the en banc decision in Diversified Indus., Inc., v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th
Cir. 1978) where the court of appeals extended the attorney-client privilege to prevent the
disclosure of information relating to a "corrupt practices" investigation conducted by inde-
pendent legal counsel. In preventing discovery on the basis of attorney-client privilege, the
court observed that to allow disclosure "may result in discouraging communications to lawyers
made in a good faith effort to promote compliance with the complex laws governing corporate
activity" and that
the application of the attorney-client privilege to this matter and others like it will
encourage corporations to seek out and correct wrong-doing in their own house and
to do so with attorneys who are obligated by the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity to conduct the inquiry in an independent and ethical manner.
To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of
corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in
order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.
Id. at 609-11.
79 See STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 2, Reports on Audited Financial State-
ments (AICPA 1974); STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 16, The Independent Au-
ditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities (AICPA 1977); STATEMENT
ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 17, Illegal Acts by Clients (AICPA 1977); CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS, Rules of Conduct 202 and 203 (AICPA 1973).
80 Securities Exchange Act Form 8-K, Item 4 requires all registrants who must file reports
with the Commission pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act to dis-
close to the SEC a change in the registrant's certifying accountant. Among the disclosures that
must be made on resignation or termination of the certifying accountant are:
(b) State whether in connection with the audits of the two most recent fiscal
years and any subsequent interim period preceding such resignation, dismissal or
engagement there were any disagreements with the former accountant on any matter
of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope
or procedure, which disagreements if not resolved to the satisfaction of the former
accountant would have caused him to make reference in connection with his report
to the subject matter of the disagreement(s) ; also, describe each such disagreement.
The disagreements required to be reported in response to the preceding sentence in-
clude both those resolved to the former accountant's satisfaction and those not
resolved to the former accountant's satisfaction. Disagreements contemplated by this
rule are those which occur at the decision-making level; i.e., between personnel of the
registrant responsible for presentation of its financial statements and personnel of the
accounting firm responsible for rendering its report.
(c) State whether the principal accountant's report on the financial statements
for any of the past two years contained an adverse opinion or a disclaimer of opinion
or was qualified as to uncertainty, audit scope, or accounting principles; also de-
scribe the nature of each such adverse opinion, disclaimer of opinion, or qualification.
(d) The registrant shall request the former accountant to furnish the registrant
with a letter addressed to the Commission stating whether he agrees with the state-
ments made by the registrant in response to this item and, if not, stating the respects
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auditing practitioners, has as its virtues the preservation of client confidentiality
and the free flow of client-auditor communication vital to the audit process,
while assuring that an isolated instance of material management fraud known to
the disengaging auditor will not go unnoticed by the SEC or any successor
auditor."'
in which he does not agree. The registrant shall file a copy of the former accoun-
tant's letter as an exhibit with all copies of the Form 8-K required to be filed pursuant
to General Instructions E.
(e) State whether the decision to change accountants was recommended or
approved by:
1) any audit or similar committee of the Board of Directors, if the issuer has
such a committee; or
2) the Board of Directors, if the issuer has no such committee.
3 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ff 31,003. This elaborate system of disclosure which attends the
termination or resignation of a registrant's auditor will assure the 'Commission and investing
public that all necessary financial statement disclosures have either been made in the financials
themselves or will be made or at least alluded to in the Form 8-K and thus will become a point
of scrutiny by the Commission and users of financial information.
In addition, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 7, Communications Between Prede-
cessor and Successor Auditors (AICPA 1975), requires that before an auditor undertakes an
engagement where a prior auditor has resigned or been terminated, the "successor auditor":
should make specific and reasonable inquiries of the predecessor regarding matters
that the successor believes will assist him in determining whether to accept the
engagement. His inquiries should include specific questions regarding, among other
things, facts that might bear on the integrity of management; on disagreements with
management as to accounting principles, auditing procedures, or other similarly
significant matters; and on the predecessor's understanding as to the reasons for the
change of auditors.
This professional standard further diminishes the possibility that a material inadequacy in
financial statement disclosure will escape the attention of the SEC or users of financial
statements.
81 Unlike accountants, there is no 8-K requirement mandating disclosure of the circum-
stances surrounding termination or resignation of outside legal counsel. Thus, in a factually
egregious case such as SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C.
1978), the proponents of a "whistle-blowing" obligation gain credibility for their arguments. See
Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Disclosure, Responsibility and Liability to Investors,
and National Student Marketing Corp., 54 NoTaa DAME LAW. 1795 (1979). It is indeed
the unusual case where legal counsel will not resign rather than countenance or facilitate a
transaction which is predicated on information that is materially misleading and known to be
such. See, e.g., In Re Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 173
(1975), 5 FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) f[ 72,195, where the Commission noted that National
Student Marketing's predecessor legal counsel and independent auditor had both resigned prior
to the merger transaction subsequently at issue, and that these resignations "came as a result
of a series of events which led [the auditors] and [the lawyers] to question the reliability of in-
formation which they received from NSMC's management." Id at 62,443.
See also In Re William R. Carter, SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-5464 (Initial
Decision March 7, 1979) where the administrative law judge held that the two attorneys who
were the subject of that disciplinary proceeding "willfully aided and abetted" their client's
violations of Rule lob-5 and section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. There the attorneys did
not resign from their engagement as outside counsel to the client, National Telephone Com-
pany, despite repeated refusals by National's chief executive officer (and controlling share-
holder) to make certain disclosures of information which the attorneys recommended as
necessary under the federal securities laws. 494 SEac. Ra.. & L. REP. (BNA) F-5-F-10
The administrative law judge observed that:
respondents' defense is that they repeatedly told Hart to comply with the applicable
securities laws and regulations, and the fact that he continually ignored such advice
is not their fault. Despite the urging of other attorneys and Bank representatives
they took no steps to see that proper disclosure of the company's financial affairs was
made to anyone, including shareholders, investors, the SEC or even National's board
of directors.
Id. at F-10. The administrative law judge held that on the basis of the ethical standards of the
law profession, as well as the custom and practice of the securities bar (which custom and prac-
tice the law judge derives from articles and speeches published by SEC officials and members of
academe), the attorneys had also violated Rule 2(e), stating:




The Commission's questionable use, and abuse, of Rule 2(e) gives rise to
serious considerations of the due process afforded the professional who is the
subject of such a proceeding, and the larger question of the proper role of the
SEC in disciplining and regulating professionals.
If the Commission continues to misuse Rule 2 (e) and usurp power it does
not really have, 2 and assuming courts countenance such continued activity, then
at a minimum the Commission would do well to shore up those aspects of its
2 (e) proceedings which are vulnerable to challenge on due process grounds, not
the least of which is its failure to require that a professional be subjected to the
severe penalty of suspension or disbarment only on a showing of scienter or some
higher standard of culpability."3 Moreover, proof of such culpability should be
by clear and convincing evidence, and based on existing principles and standards
and not those which grow out of the proceeding and are given ex post facto ap-
plication. In no event should sanctions be administered absent a clear finding
ties with respect to appropriate disclosures to all concerned, including stockholders,
directors and the investing public, of the material facts described herein, and thus
knowingly engaged in unethical and improper professional conduct, as charged in
the Order.
Id. at F-13. If the administrative law judge's decision stands unblemished by further Commis-
sion review, it potentially could lead to great harm due to its intimation that in all circumstances
-and not merely those before the administrative law judge-legal counsel not only must resign
in the face of a dispute with his client, but also must disclose such dispute to the SEC.
For an account of the lawyer's reaction to this decision see the Wall Street Journal,
March 13, 1979, at 4, col. 4. See also the SEC's investigative report relating to the activities of
National Telephone's outside directors. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14380 (January
16, 1978), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,410.
82 Section 1502 (a) (5) of the proposed American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code
explicitly provides the Commission with authority to discipline professionals practicing before
it. ALI FEDERAL SEcuRIIs CODE, Reporters Revision of Text of Ten. Draft Nos. 1-3, p.
182 (October 1, 1974). In its initial draft, the ALI 'Code contained no explicit provision for
disciplining accountants, the Reporter's comment stating that: "It seems just as well to leave
implicit the Commission's authority to discipline accountants who practice before it - and
this applies equally to lawyers - as in Rule of Practice 2 (e)." T.D. No. 3, p. 26 (April 1,
1970) (emphasis in original).
To the extent that Congress addresses the ALI's efforts at codification of the federal securi-
ties code, it can be expected that the SEC's authority to discipline professionals will be an
issue which will be fully addressed. See the announcement of the ABA Subcommittee on SEC
Practice and Enforcement Matters regarding that subcommittee's proposed review of SEC
adjudicative and disciplinary proceedings. 484 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-17 (January 3,
1979), including the Commission's powers to discipline professionals.
83 See Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976) where Judge Friend-
ly stated:
The Court left open "the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an
action for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5." 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
The Court said nothing about whether scienter is a necessary element in disciplinary
actions under § 15. These actions share with damage suits the quality of visiting
serious consequences on past conduct, even though they also have a remedial effect.
They thus differ from injunctive proceedings, the objective of which is solely to
prevent threatened future harm, although unlawful conduct is necessary - if not
always sufficient - to demonstrate the reality of this threat. We therefore assume,
arguendo, without deciding, that the Hochfelder culpability standard applies in dis-
ciplinary proceedings. Cf. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 267-68
(1965) ("Revocation, indeed, seems often to be used as a sanction not so much to
control the respondent as to warn others, and thus it has a significant 'penal' com-
ponent, even though the courts may choose to mask its character by calling it a
'civil' remedy") (footnote omitted).
See also In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 554, 555-56 (1968); SEG v. Savoy Indus., 587 F. 2d 1149
(D.C. Cir. 1978); In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361, 369 (7th Cir. 1950).
RULE 2 (e)
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
that the professional is likely to engage in future wrongdoing.
In addition, the Commission should refrain from advancing in 2(e) pro-
ceedings new or "exotic" theories of accounting principles or auditing standards
which are better and more fairly addressed through the hearing and rulemaking
processes of the accounting profession. 4 The imposition of such safeguards in
2(e) enforcement proceedings goes no further than that which is expected and
required in injunctive enforcement proceedings, where the stakes in winning or
losing are no greater.
Moreover, the SEC's continued misuse of Rule 2 (e) should not be necessary
under any view of need, including the Commission's, if the results of the ac-
counting profession's current efforts at self-regulation prove successful. The self-
policing efforts of the professional accounting organizations such as the AICPA
and state societies of CPAs are under way at an accelerated pace 5 and in many
instances have been and will be supplemented by increased regulatory activities of
the state boards of accountancy which license CPAs.' This pervasive scheme of
regulation, if actively implemented, should totally preempt the need for SEC
involvement in disciplinary matters and thereby foreclose Commission intrusion
into the daily activities of the accounting profession.
In the absence of future restraint by the SEC and increased regulatory
efforts by the profession it can be expected that the present-day misuse of Rule
2 (e) will not subside."7
84 See the Report of the Special Committee of the AICPA to Study the Structure of the
Auditing Standards Executive Committee, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, October 1978, at 131-38.
85 See SEC Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's Over-
sight Role, at 8-9, 46 (July 1978).
86 See, e.g., recently enacted professional disciplinary legislation in the State of Iowa which,
among other things, places an affirmative whistle-blowing obligation on all accounting practi-
tioners to report to the state Board of Accountancy known acts of misconduct committed by
fellow practitioners. Failure to report is itself a statutory violation subjecting the practitioner
to suspension or termination of license. Senate File 312, § 9(2) 1978. See generally 7 IowA
CODE ANN. §§ 116.3, 116.21(4) (1978-79 Supp.).
87 The call for change in the Commission's use of Rule 2(e) is not new for in 1973 this
law review recorded the following recommendation made by a former SEC Commissioner:
The 'Commission is entitled to expect that professionals who practice before it,
such as lawyers, accountants, engineers and geologists, should maintain high standards
of ethics and professional conduct. To this end, the Commission has recently in-
stituted court proceedings in which it has named lawyers and accountants as de-
fendants. This author has urged the need for study of such litigation and a definition
of the role of attorneys in representing public companies, and otherwise practicing
before the Commission. Rules of professional conduct should not be developed
through case-by-case litigation, but rather through reasoned discussion in the public
interest. Lawyers have long maintained rules of professional responsibility and the
courts have enforced compliance with such standards since lawyers are officers of
the courts. Other professions are capable of doing likewise. The Commission's uni-
laterally seeking to establish its ideas or concepts of professional responsibility, or
those of its staff, through litigation rather than bilaterally with the various pro-
fessions does not merit commendation, but requires change. As with its failure
to change its procedural rules to invest its administrative trial procedures with a
needed tone of fairness, the Commission as an institution likewise has not moved
expeditiously in the public interest to formulate standards of professional con-
duct. It would be well if the Commission would modify its posture from "headhunter"
to regulator, in the sense that it looks for compliance with established standards.
McCauley, The Securities Laws - After 40 Years: A Need for Rethinking, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 1092, 1106-07 '(1973) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the Commission's continued
abuse of Rule 2(e) in the period subsequent to Mr. -McCauley's recommendation bears wit-
ness to the authors' reservation.
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